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One of the most remarkable characteristics of the world 
economy today is the enormous, ever worsening deﬁ  cit 
on the current account of the US balance of payments, 
accompanied by the consistent accumulation of surpluses 
in most other regions of the world  (2). The largest economy 
and main military and geopolitical superpower has there-
fore also become the world’s biggest debtor. This has 
given rise to concerns in academic and political circles 
regarding the sustainability of the current situation and 
the potential risks for the global economy of a sudden, 
disorderly adjustment. For several years now, this issue 
has been at the top of the agenda in international forums 
such as the G7 or G20 meetings and it featured as a dis-
cussion point at many scientiﬁ  c colloquiums.
The ﬁ  rst part of this article outlines the current situation 
and examines whether it can be considered exceptional 
historically and from an international perspective. In the 
second part, the main focus is on how the US current 
account deﬁ   cit came about and how it is ﬁ  nanced. 
Part three examines the issue of the sustainability of the 
  deﬁ  cit. Particular attention is paid to the special status of 
the US economy and its currency, the dollar, on the global 
markets. Finally, part four discusses a number of scenarios 
that may help bring about an improvement.
1. Is the current imbalance exceptional ?
1.1  The current account
In 2004, the US current account deﬁ  cit reached 5.7 p.c. 
of GDP, the largest deﬁ  cit since 1960. In the sixties and 
seventies, the country was generally still generating 
surpluses, but this changed in 1982, when the US cur-
rent account started to record rapidly worsening deﬁ  cits, 
which provisionally peaked at 3.4 p.c. of GDP in 1987. 
Thanks to the implementation of various measures to 
which the American, European and Japanese authorities 
committed, in the “Louvre Agreement” in 1987, the deﬁ  -
cit then declined continuously and actually turned into a 
small surplus by the ﬁ  rst half of 1991 which was however 
partly due to the ofﬁ  cial transfers made by a number of 
foreign governments by way of a contribution to the costs 
of the ﬁ  rst Gulf War. From then on, the deﬁ  cit rose virtu-
ally uninterruptedly and, by the end of 1999, it exceeded 
the record level reached in the mid-1980s.
(1)  The authors would like to thank K. Burggraeve for his contribution.
(2)  The current account of the balance of payments of a country records the 
transactions of goods and services, receipts and payments of income, as well as 
transfers between residents and non-residents over a particular period of time. 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the current account balance equals the 
total ﬁ  nancial balance of the economy. A current account deﬁ  cit therefore reﬂ  ects 
to what extent a country resorts to foreign savings and implies an increase in the 
net debt or a reduction in net claims towards foreign countries.50
The size of the US current account deﬁ  cit is not only 
unprecedented in US post-war history, but it also 
seems to be rather exceptional from an international 
perspective. In 2004, of all the developed economies, 
only Portugal, Australia and New Zealand had a com-
parable deﬁ   cit as a percentage of GDP. However, the 
US economy is the world’s largest, so that the deﬁ  cit in 
absolute terms reaches more than 600  billion dollars, 
while Australia’s deﬁ   cit for example amounts to only 
39  billion dollars. Furthermore, the US dollar plays a 
prominent role on global ﬁ  nancial markets. As a result 
of both these aspects, even a huge adjustment of the 
external deﬁ  cit of a smaller economy would have less of 
an effect on the global economy and the international 
ﬁ  nancial system than a more moderate adjustment in the 
US current account deﬁ  cit.
Historically too, the persistently large US current account 
deﬁ   cit is remarkable. For instance, the International 
Monetary Fund  (1) (IMF) came to the conclusion, based on 
a review of the existing literature, complemented by its 
own research, that current account deﬁ  cits of over 4 p.c. 
of GDP for three consecutive years were fairly rare, and 
that they were limited to comparatively small open econo-
mies. Three years of large deﬁ  cits are usually followed by 
three years of improvement by 2 p.c. of GDP. This is often 
accompanied by a signiﬁ  cant depreciation in real terms 
of the currency involved, as well as slower growth. The 
Bank for International Settlements  (2) (BIS) reaches similar 
conclusions, both with regard to the threshold value from 
which an improvement occurs and the channels through 
which adjustments can be made.
Finally, the current situation is also exceptional in geo-
graphical terms. The US current account deﬁ  cit ﬁ  nds its 
counterpart in the current account surpluses of other 
countries. Although current accounts already displayed 
marked imbalances in the eighties, the global dimen-
sion was rather limited at the time  : the imbalances were 
mainly concentrated in the United States, on the one 
hand, and Japan and the main European economies, par-
ticularly Germany, on the other. Until 1987, the US deﬁ  cit 
widened virtually in line with the increase in the surpluses 
in Japan and Europe, followed by a trend reversal during 
the remainder of the decade. From the mid-1990s, how-
ever, the US deﬁ  cit ﬁ  nds its counterpart in the surpluses 
in virtually every other region  (3) and the problem has con-
sequently taken on a global dimension.
The United States, the euro area and Japan continue to 
play a major role in world trade. However, an increasing 
number of emerging economies, particularly in Asia, are 
becoming more and more important. The four so-called 
Asian tigers already recorded an appreciable current 
account surplus in the eighties. Since the end of the 
1990s, after an interruption during the Asia crisis, their 
role has once again been increasingly gaining in impor-
tance. China made its entry on the world market in the 
mid-1990s and its trade surplus has greatly contributed 
to the Asian surplus over recent years. As far as the 
other regions are concerned, the OPEC cartel, like Russia, 
recorded a substantial surplus in the last few years owing 
























































































































































































CHART 1  CURRENT ACCOUNT IN SELECTED ECONOMIES
  (Balances in percentages of GDP, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : Federal Reserve, IMF, OECD.
Percentages of GDP (left-hand scale)




(1) IMF  (2002).
(2) BIS  (2004).
(3)  In this respect, it should be noted that the statistics for the global economy show 
an overall deﬁ  cit, whereas in principle, the ﬁ  gures for all the countries in the 
world added together should be in balance. As a result of the scale of gross ﬂ  ows 
recorded in the balances of payments, these statistics often contain errors.51
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1.2  The net international investment position
As a consequence of the persistent and steadily widening 
current account deﬁ  cit in the US balance of payments, 
the country’s international investment position, i.e. the 
balance of its outstanding assets and liabilities vis-à-vis 
foreign countries, has deteriorated sharply. Hence, the 
American net external asset position at the end of the 
eighties turned into a net external debt position which has 
worsened dramatically since the mid-1990s, from 4.1 p.c. 
of GDP in 1995 to 24.1 p.c. of GDP in 2003.
At ﬁ  rst sight, this does not seem exceptional. In several 
countries, for example Australia and New Zealand, the 
net external debt position as a percentage of GDP is much 
worse. However, of all the developed countries for which 
ﬁ  gures are available, US net debt, in billions of dollars, is 
about 50 p.c. higher than that of all the other net debtor 
countries combined.
Based on data from economic forecasts made by the 
OECD for 2005 and 2006, there is also the possibility that 
the US net external debt position may actually continue 
to worsen substantially. Based on a mechanical accumula-
tion of the expected current account deﬁ  cits, the US net 
external debt would continue to rise sharply, from around 
24 p.c. of GDP in 2003 to almost 38 p.c. of GDP in 2006 
or, in billions of dollars, from 2650 to around 5000.
However, this simple calculation does not take into 
account the so-called valuation effects which may sub-
stantially slow down or stimulate the increase of the net 
debt. Hence it is noteworthy that the net investment 
position of the United States as a percentage of GDP 
barely worsened in 2002 and 2003, despite the huge and 
still growing current account deﬁ  cit recorded during that 
period. The additional external debt caused by the US 
current account deﬁ  cit (quantitative effect) was in effect 
largely offset by the positive effect of the depreciation of 
the US dollar (valuation effect). The depreciation of the 
dollar actually increased the value of the assets, mostly 
held in foreign currencies, of the United States vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world, whereas US liabilities were largely 
held in dollars, in view of the status of the dollar as an 
international currency.
Anticipating future valuation effects can be difﬁ  cult 
since they mainly depend on developments in the dollar 
exchange rate which are very uncertain. Furthermore, the 
importance of the valuation effects should not be overes-
timated, since they are likely to imply “reputation costs” 
sooner or later. Repeated currency depreciations can after 
all prompt foreign dollar investors to call for higher inter-
est rates, which may worsen the net debt position due to 
the negative impact on the income and current account. 
The current account therefore remains the main channel 
through which the international investment position of 
the United States can be improved.
Despite the substantial increase in net debt, net factor 
incomes have so far remained positive in the United 
States, and here, investment income is by far the most 
important factor, rather than labour income. The United 
States are indeed a net recipient of income from foreign 
direct investments (FDI) and from investments in equities, 
whereas it is a net payer of interest on debt instruments 
(largely interest payments on US government bonds). 
Although the combined outstanding net position of the 
United States in FDI and investments in equities over 
recent years deteriorated sharply and the outstanding net 
debt in the form of debt instruments grew substantially 
– to around 28 p.c. of US GDP in 2003 –, the income 







































































CHART 2  GLOBAL IMBALANCES
  (Current account balances in billions of dollars)
Source : IMF.
(1) Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea.








Other industrialised countries (2)
Rest of the world
United States52
payments on debt instruments, since the implicit return 
on the external assets held by the United States is higher 
than that on its external liabilities. On the one hand, the 
average return of the FDI in the United States turns out 
to be signiﬁ  cantly lower than that of the American FDI in 
the rest of the world. On the other hand, the return on 
US debt instruments has been relatively low for some time 
– putting downward pressure on interest payments –, 
although it is comparable to the return on foreign debt 
instruments held by US residents.
That does not alter the fact that net factor incomes, as a 
percentage of GDP, have been on a downward trend over 
the years, and that they were barely positive in 2004. In its 
economic forecasts, the OECD estimates that this balance 
will turn into a small deﬁ  cit in 2005, increasing to 0.2 p.c. 
of GDP in 2006. This would mean that the United States 
would be a net payer of factor income for the ﬁ  rst time 
in almost a century.
2.  Underlying macroeconomic trends
Below, we take a closer look at the macroeconomic 
factors underlying the US current account deﬁ  cit  that 
determined the trend and that may play a key role in 
future developments. In view of the macroeconomic links 
between an economy’s external and internal balances 
(the current account of the balance of payments and 
the saving-investment balance) and between the current 
account deﬁ  cit and the way it is ﬁ  nanced, the issue can be 
approached from different complementary viewpoints.
2.1  Approach from the trade ﬂ  ows perspective
The increase in the US balance of payments’ current 
account deﬁ   cit in the nineties can almost entirely be 
explained by a deterioration in the balance of trade 
in goods, which recorded a rapidly widening deﬁ  cit. 
Likewise, the surpluses in the balance of trade in services 
and in the income account have declined slightly over the 
last few years. By contrast, the balance on current trans-
fers recorded a persistent but stable deﬁ  cit, expressed as 
a percentage of GDP.
In geographical terms, the growing deﬁ  cit in the balance of 
trade in goods can be traced back to, on the one hand, a 
large and widening trade deﬁ  cit with the traditional trade 
partners Europe and Japan, and on the other, the increas-
ing deﬁ  cit with a number of new players on world markets, 
particularly China. It is often claimed that the substantially 
faster US economic growth, particularly during the second 
half of the nineties, is a possible reason for the persistently 
large trade deﬁ   cit with Europe and Japan. Furthermore, 
the US economy is characterised by asymmetric income 
elasticities for exports and imports. Even if the US economy 
were to grow only as fast as that of the euro area or 
Japan, the US trade deﬁ   cit would still worsen because 
American consumers seem to have more of a preference 
for foreign goods and services than foreign consumers 
do for American goods and services. The aforementioned 
asymmetry was ﬁ   rst observed in 1969 by Houthakker 
and Magee; in economic literature, it is often referred to 

































CHART 3  NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION IN 
SELECTED ECONOMIES
  (Percentages of GDP, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : BEA, ECB, IMF, OECD, NBB.
Percentages of GDP (left-hand scale)
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Hypothesis”. Finally, the sharp appreciation of the dollar 
recorded between mid-1995 and the end of 2001 can 
be assumed to have had a lagged effect. In real effective 
terms, the US currency rose in value by around 40 p.c.
Apart from Europe and Japan, the deﬁ  cit also worsened 
with regard to China and, to a lesser extent, with Latin 
America. In 2004, the trade deﬁ   cit with China already 
amounted to nearly a quarter of the total deﬁ  cit in the 
balance of trade in goods. The growing importance of 
China in US trade relations is broadly indicative of the 
fact that part of the regional production chain in Asia has 
shifted from Japan and South Korea, among others, to 
China. Furthermore, the importance of American FDI in 
China has increased, i.e. within the sectors exporting to 
the United States.
2.2   Approach from the savings and investments 
perspective
The current account balance can also be seen in terms 
of the difference between savings and investments in 
an economy, since, from an accounting point of view, 
that difference can be shown to be equal to the cur-
rent account balance. In the nineties, the United States’ 
  growing need for foreign ﬁ  nancing coincided with a sharp 
decline in the domestic savings surplus in the private 
sector. Towards the mid-1990s, the surplus even turned 
into a deﬁ  cit, which continued to widen until the year 
2000. Although the government gradually dissaved less, 
it could not prevent the total ﬁ  nancing deﬁ  cit of the US 
economy from increasing. At that time, the underlying 
macroeconomic conditions differed substantially from 
those of the eighties, when the US economy was charac-
terised by a so-called “twin deﬁ  cit”, i.e. a current account 
deﬁ  cit and a budget deﬁ  cit.
The increase in the private ﬁ  nancing requirement during 
the nineties stemmed largely from an acceleration in 
investment expenditure. It all took place against a back-
ground of sustained strong productivity growth in the 
United States, which was generally thought to be asso-
ciated with the rise of the internet and the rapid inte-
gration of new technological developments in IT and 
  telecommunications in the production process, an impor-
tant aspect of what then became known as the “new 
economy”. Simultaneously, private savings fell, which was 
partly related to the improved wealth position of house-
holds, particularly as a result of rising equity prices.
However, since the start of the new millennium, the 
macroeconomic conditions underlying the rising external 





















CHART 4  THE US CURRENT ACCOUNT : MAIN BALANCES
  (Percentages of GDP)
Source : BEA.
Balance of trade in goods
Balance of trade in services
Income account




























































































































CHART 5  US CURRENT ACCOUNT AND 
SAVING-INVESTMENT BALANCE
  (Percentages of GDP)
Source : BEA.
(1) For statistical reasons, the current account balance and the total financing 
balance show a discrepancy.
(2) S-I stands for the difference between savings and investments within a sector.
Current account balance (1)
Private sector (S–I) (2)
Public sector (S–I) (2)54
Investments in the US economy dropped sharply during 
2001-2002, once the technology bubble had burst. 
Thereafter, investments gradually picked up again, but 
they were initially targeted at housing and at sectors 
of non-tradable commodities. This development is not 
unimportant. As a rule, those sectors contribute little to 
the export performance of an economy and such invest-
ments therefore do very little to improve the capacity of 
the US economy to repay its foreign debt. As for private 
savings, these were up slightly thanks to companies trying 
to improve their balance sheets, whereas the savings ratio 
of households continued to decline. Overall, the saving-
investment balance of the private sector was more or less 
in equilibrium in 2002 and 2003. Tax cuts and an increase 
in public spending, including on defence, however rapidly 
wiped out the surplus in the public ﬁ  nances thus leading 
to a large deﬁ  cit, which resulted in a return to the “twin 
deﬁ   cit”. Finally, in 2004, corporate investments picked 
up strongly, tipping the saving-investment balance of the 
private sector into the red as well.
2.3  Approach from the capital ﬂ  ows perspective
From the mid-1990s, the increase in the current account 
deﬁ  cit in the US balance of payments was accompanied 
by a number of noteworthy changes affecting the course 
of capital ﬂ   ows, both from an investment instruments 
perspective and in terms of their origin. Overall, from 
2001 onwards a signiﬁ  cant  inﬂ   ow of private FDI and 
investments in equities from Europe made way for invest-
ments by Asian public sector investors in US government 
debt instruments.
From the mid-1990s until 2000, capital ﬂ  ows  mainly 
originated from European (private) investors. Originally, 
these were investments in debt instruments, which 
was partly due to the positive interest rate differential 
compared with the euro area during a large part of that 
period; in the context of the strong productivity growth 
achieved by the US economy, capital inﬂ  ows also took 
on the form of FDI and investments in equities from 
1997 onwards. Other factors that may have played a 
role in generating those capital ﬂ  ows, apart from the 
anticipated higher returns, are the relatively liquid US 
ﬁ  nancial markets, a shift in the currency composition of 
portfolios, more particularly in the run-up to EMU, and 
a relaxation of legislation, for example regarding foreign 
investments in pension funds.
With hindsight, the expectations regarding the returns 
on investments in the so-called “new economy” turned 
out to be too optimistic. When the technology bubble 
burst, European investors suffered heavy losses. When 
it became obvious that the anticipated returns were not 
going to materialise, inﬂ  ows of FDI and investments in 
equities dried up from 2001 onwards and even turned 
into capital outﬂ   ows in 2003 and 2004. Other things 
being equal, the reduced capital inﬂ  ows should inevitably 
have led to a narrowing of the US current account deﬁ  cit, 
especially as a result of slower US growth. However, this 
did not happen, since the reduced capital inﬂ  ows were 
largely offset by substantial capital inﬂ  ows in the form of 
purchases of corporate and   government bonds. In paral-
lel with the larger proportion of debt instruments in the 
ﬁ  nancial account of the United States  (1), the importance 


































































CHART 6  NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO THE UNITED STATES, BY 
REGION OF ORIGIN AND BY INVESTMENT 
INSTRUMENT
  (Billions of dollars)
Source : US Treasury.
Europe (including United Kingdom)
Rest of the world







FDI and equities : total
Asia
(1)  It should be noted that the classiﬁ  cation by region of origin can only be made 
based on the location where the transaction took place, rather than on the 
buyer’s country of origin. This explains the prominent position occupied by the 
United Kingdom, for example : many transactions in US ﬁ  nancial instruments 
with residents from the euro area, the OPEC countries or even Asia are likely 
to take place via the City of London. For the same reason, the importance of 
the Caribbean area has increased in recent years (“offshore centres”). Those 
“centres” have been included in the chart under the heading “rest of the world”. 
The classiﬁ  cation of net capital inﬂ  ows into the United States by region of origin 
therefore only has an indicative value.55
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In terms of investor type, the larger share of debt instru-
ments in the net capital inﬂ  ows into the United States has 
been accompanied since 2002 by a sharp rise in ﬁ  nancing 
by foreign public authorities, mainly from Asia, and largely 
in the form of purchases of government bonds issued by 
the US Treasury.
The accumulation of substantial ofﬁ  cial reserves by Asian 
central banks, combined with data showing that the 
global increase in foreign exchange reserves in recent 
years can primarily be attributed to an increase in dollar 
reserves, is an indication that it was mainly the central 
banks of the countries concerned that bought these debt 
instruments. Japan accumulated the highest volume of 
ofﬁ  cial reserves, but China too has been very active in 
this respect. Considering that Taiwan, Korea and India 
carry less weight in the global economy, the reserves 
those countries accumulated can also be regarded as 
exceptional.
3.  Is the current situation sustainable ?
The US current account deﬁ  cit has taken on huge propor-
tions, both from an American point of view and from an 
international perspective. It is therefore not surprising that 
serious concerns have been expressed over recent years 
about the sustainability of these imbalances.
Neither a substantial current account deﬁ  cit in the balance 
of payments nor a high external debt need necessarily be 
unsustainable, nor are they necessarily a source of insta-
bility. As long as foreign investors are convinced that their 
investment will be proﬁ  table and that the debtor will con-
tinue to be able to pay off his external debts, investors will 
be prepared to ﬁ  nance the capital requirements, thereby 
providing lasting support for the situation.
This begs the question of whether the United States 
is comparable to other countries. After all, the idea is 
now gaining ground that, unlike other countries facing 
similar circumstances, the United States does not need 
to fear a sudden decrease in the capital ﬂ  ows used to 
ﬁ  nance its deﬁ  cit, given its prominent role in the global 
ﬁ  nancial system. Not only does the United States pos-
sess very deep ﬁ  nancial markets in which investors can 
readily build up a diverse portfolio in dollar assets alone, 
but the dollar remains the main international currency, 
for example for trade transactions and for currency 
reserves held by central banks. For those reasons, a 
further increase in the US current account deﬁ  cit would 
still be capable of being ﬁ  nanced quite easily by foreign 
private investors and public authorities for some time 
to come.
In this context, Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and 
Peter Garber even describe the current international mon-
etary system as a type of “revived” Bretton Woods system in 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 



























CHART 7  NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO THE UNITED STATES, BY 
INVESTOR TYPE AND BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
ACCORDING TO REGION OF ORIGIN
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CHART 8  OFFICIAL RESERVES




(2) Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Thailand.
(3)  Non-industrialised countries of Europe, other Asian countries, the Middle East, 
Latin America and Africa.
China
Japan
Industrialised countries (excluding Japan)
Rest of the world (3)
Other countries in East Asia (2)
directly or indirectly, contribute to a further fall in the 
US private savings ratio, e.g. because of wealth creation 
resulting from higher property prices. On the other hand, 
the weakened competitiveness may have curbed invest-
ments in tradable goods, which ultimately form the basis 
for the capacity to export and to reduce the trade deﬁ  cit. 
Against a background of household savings reaching an 
all-time low, warnings are often sounded with respect to 
a possible sharp adjustment of the internal imbalances in 
the United States, for example in the event that American 
household wealth were to grow at a signiﬁ  cantly slower 
rate compared to previous years.
Although the exchange rate regime supports export-led 
growth in many Asian countries, it also imposes impor-
tant costs on the region. For instance, in a number of 
these countries, adhering to a policy of ﬁ  xed exchange 
rates may, more or less, have lead to a loss of control over 
broad money growth. Some observers see this as creating 
the risk of excessive money growth which may create a 
bubble, for example in real estate, with potentially serious 
consequences, also in view of the weak ﬁ  nancial sector 
(1)  Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004a, 2004b).
(2)  In Roubini and Setser (2005), p. 8-10, the estimates of the downward effect 
of these investments in dollars on US interest rates are said to diverge widely, 
ranging from 40 to around 200 basis points, depending on the source.
a series of important papers  (1). After all, there are similarities 
with the post-war period. Firstly, a number of Asian coun-
tries, including China, are at present formally or informally 
applying a ﬁ  xed or quasi-ﬁ  xed exchange rate against the 
dollar. This resembles an informal dollar standard reminiscent 
of the gold-dollar standard of the original Bretton Woods 
system. Furthermore, the accumulation of dollar reserves 
by several Asian countries, a consequence of the interven-
tions needed to prevent an appreciation of their currencies 
against the dollar, has contributed signiﬁ   cantly in recent 
years to the export-led growth strategy of those countries 
as well as to the ﬁ  nancing of the US current account deﬁ  cit. 
Just as in the original Bretton Woods system, the United 
States can therefore still be considered as the “core nation” 
enjoying the privilege of issuing the main international 
reserve currency, and the countries in the “periphery” are 
prepared to buy dollars in order to achieve catch-up growth. 
However, as new countries have been integrated into the 
global economy, the “periphery” has largely moved away 
from Europe and Japan to the rest of East Asia, compared 
with the original Bretton Woods system.
In recent years, the exchange rate regime in the context 
of the “new” Bretton Woods has undoubtedly offered 
various world regions a number of mutual advantages. For 
the Asian countries, the exchange rate policy was consis-
tent with their export-oriented strategy for growth. On the 
other hand, the United States has found a not insubstan-
tial source of ﬁ  nance for its current account deﬁ  cit in the 
central banks of the Asian “periphery” over recent years. 
Furthermore, the strong dollar ensured that import prices 
rose more slowly in the United States, damping down inﬂ  a-
tionary pressures. US growth could therefore consistently 
rely on the expansion of domestic demand, which acted as 
an engine for growth in the rest of the world.
It is nevertheless safe to assume that the exchange rate 
relations, which are artiﬁ  cially maintained in the “new” 
Bretton Woods regime, have created a number of distor-
tions.
In the United States, some distortions may have affected 
spending. Exchange rate interventions by Asian central 
banks supported the dollar, artiﬁ  cially providing an addi-
tional boost for American imports, particularly of cheap 
Asian products. At the same time, the investments made 
by those central banks in US government bonds may 
have contributed to relatively low interest rates  (2) despite 
the mounting budget deﬁ  cit, which would normally fuel 
consumption and demand for housing and therefore, 57
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in some of these countries. In this respect, reference is 
also made to Japan’s experience in the late eighties and 
early nineties, when a speculative bubble burst in the 
real estate and equity markets in that country, the conse-
quences of which are still being felt by the Japanese econ-
omy today. According to some   observers  (1), the “new” 
Bretton Woods regime also implies an international risk 
exchange whereby the Asian region, on the one hand, 
exports ﬁ  nancial means that are invested in high-quality 
US government bonds and, on the other, imports capital 
that is invested in the domestic economy in higher-risk 
assets, for example equities and bonds of medium or 
low quality, or in FDI. This international risk exchange 
may curb the development of ﬁ  nancial markets in those 
economies. Leaving aside Japan, the holding on by these 
countries to such huge dollar reserves may also involve 
high opportunity costs, since the return on risk-free US 
debt instruments is usually lower than that on investments 
in domestic assets. Last but not least, these central banks 
run a great exchange risk with respect to their reserves  : 
if the link between their currencies and the dollar is sus-
pended, they may incur substantial losses.
A number of surveys on the subject, including those car-
ried out by the IMF  (2), show that some Asian countries 
have built up excessive foreign exchange reserves since 
the crisis in their region. In effect, the currency reserves of 
several Asian central banks have not only risen substan-
tially in absolute terms but also as a ratio of imports or of 
the short-term external debt of the country concerned. 
The latter ratio is often used as a reliable indicator of the 
degree of vulnerability of a particular country to a ﬁ  nan-
cial crisis. Based on empirical research, the IMF comes to 
the conclusion that a ratio of reserves to short-term debt 
equalling 1  constitutes a critical value. In a number of 
Asian countries, the reserves have risen sharply in relation 
to the short-term debt, sometimes far above the critical 
value. This is the case in Thailand, India, Taiwan and espe-
cially China. From an analysis of the factors that usually 
justify a normal build-up of foreign exchange reserves, 
the IMF also concludes that the volume of the foreign 
exchange reserves of the Asian emerging countries 
between 1997 and 2001 still matched the development 
of the underlying explanatory variables, whereas this was 
no longer the case from 2002 onwards.
Given the success of the growth strategy, the Asian 
monetary authorities will presumably continue to pursue 
their current policies for some time to come, even if 
only to prevent a sudden appreciation of their currencies 
against the dollar or in an effort to protect their weak 
ﬁ  nancial   sectors. Nonetheless the current regime govern-
ing exchange rates and capital ﬂ  ows is to a considerable 
extent dependent on a unilateral willingness of those 
authorities to continue ﬁ  nancing the substantial US cur-
rent account deﬁ   cit on favourable terms. This makes 
the US economy vulnerable to a sudden decline in that 
willingness and entails a risk for the global economy that 
should not be underestimated. In contrast to the original 
Bretton Woods system, in which the value of the dollar 
was guaranteed by its convertibility to gold at a ﬁ  xed 
price, no institutional agreement exists in the current 
regime guaranteeing that the countries in the “periphery” 
will maintain the current system. Furthermore, even the 
original Bretton Woods arrangement ultimately collapsed 
under the weight of the fundamental imbalances.
As B. Eichengreen  (3) observed, the world has also under-
gone some dramatic changes since the collapse of the 
original Bretton Woods system. Nowadays, the countries 
in the “periphery” are more numerous and diverse than at 
the time of Bretton Woods, which makes it less likely that 
they would adopt a common stance than was the case in 
the original system. It is therefore not inconceivable that a 
“free rider” problem may arise, with countries switching 
all (or part of) their dollar reserves to other currencies in 
anticipation of a depreciation of the dollar at a point in 
time when the dollar is still generally supported. Against 
a background of stringent capital controls elsewhere, 
investing in the United States in the ﬁ  fties and sixties was 
virtually the only alternative for domestic investments, but 
a change in growth prospects or in the market climate 
may nowadays lead to major portfolio shifts in favour of 
investments in other currencies. Furthermore, the euro 
currently offers a viable alternative as an international 
reserve currency.
Exaggerated concerns regarding the sustainability of the 
ﬁ  nancing of the US current account deﬁ  cit can be count-
ered with the argument that the central banks of some 
Asian countries are certainly not the only source ﬁ  nanc-
ing the deﬁ  cit. After all, even in 2003 and 2004, a large 
part was still ﬁ  nanced by private investors. These invest-
ments are also driven by the expected returns, which in 
turn depend on the relative growth expectations in the 
various economies. Since growth in Europe and Japan is 
apparently still hampered by structural problems and the 
United States may continue to generate higher growth for 
some time to come, private ﬁ  nance may be secure. Private 
investors however probably also base their expectations 
regarding the value of the dollar, an important factor in 
determining their expected returns, on the attitude of the 
central banks in this respect. If the Asian countries were 
to radically change their exchange rate policy, private 
(1) Including  McCaulay  (2003).
(2) IMF  (2003).
(3) Eichengreen  (2004).58
  investors might also become much more reluctant to hold 
on to their dollar assets.
In view of the undisputed mutual beneﬁ  ts to signiﬁ  cant 
world regions offered by the new Bretton Woods, an 
important “exit” problem does emerge. Experience with 
ﬁ  xed exchange rates, namely the original Bretton Woods 
system, however, teaches us that it is better to correct dis-
tortions in good time rather than to wait until the pressure 
is very high. The risks of a sudden disorderly adjustment 
to the US current account deﬁ  cit are indeed signiﬁ  cant, 
particularly in respect of a substantial fall in the dollar or a 
sharp rise in interest rates which would have serious impli-
cations and not just for the ﬁ  nancial markets. Needless 
to say, all this could have major consequences for eco-
nomic growth in the United States and in the rest of 
the world.
4.  How can the adjustment be made ?
4.1  Adjustment exclusively via the exchange rate
Different scenarios are conceivable to deal with the global 
imbalances. One of the options (“benign neglect”) is to 
intervene as little as possible in the market with economic 
policies, but to allow the adjustment to be made as far 
as possible via the exchange rate. In such a scenario, the 
risk of disorderly exchange and interest rate ﬂ  uctuations, 
often caused by a crisis of conﬁ  dence in the dollar, cannot 
be excluded, particularly since markets tend to overshoot. 
Sudden excessive exchange rate movements disrupt the 
functioning of an economy because they do not give the 
economic players sufﬁ  cient time to adapt their decision-
making to the new conditions.
Furthermore, the results of simulations – such as those 
based on the NiGEM model  (1) or carried out by the OECD 
based on its Interlink model  (2) –, indicate that a signiﬁ  -
cant narrowing of the US current account deﬁ  cit, when 
sought to be achieved solely via an adjustment of the 
exchange rate, would require a substantial depreciation 
of the dollar. For example, OECD calculations show that a 
nominal effective depreciation of the dollar by 22.5 p.c., 
spread over a wide range of currencies including the 
Asian currencies, would only bring about a moderate 
narrowing of the US deﬁ  cit, namely by 1.3 p.c. of GDP 
after a period of six years. A complete rebalancing of the 
US current account, amounting to 5.7 p.c. of GDP, would 
consequently require a massive exchange rate shock that 
might dramatically affect the current economic structure 
and would also be quite exceptional in historical terms. By 
way of comparison, reference can be made to the period 
between February 2002 and April 2005, when, according 
to data compiled by the Federal Reserve, the weighted 
average exchange rate of the dollar only dropped by 
around 15 p.c. The depreciation of the dollar against the 
euro represented approximately half of this nominal effec-
tive depreciation, which means that the appreciation of 
the euro has already contributed greatly to the adjustment 
of the dollar exchange rate.
4.2  Possible economic policy measures
Adjusting exchange rates as an isolated measure therefore 
does not appear to be very effective in terms of deal-
ing with the global imbalances in the current accounts. 
For the purpose of gradual, orderly adjustment, it is 
  increasingly argued that the economies concerned should 
adopt simultaneous measures in different policy areas, 
such as ﬁ  scal consolidation in the US, implementation of 
structural reforms in the euro area and Japan with a view 
to increasing the growth potential of those economies 
and gradually allowing greater exchange rate ﬂ  exibility 
in Asia.
(1)  NiGEM is a comprehensive econometric model of the global economy, designed 
by the UK’s National Institute of Economic and Social Research.













CHART 9  DEPRECIATION OF THE NOMINAL EFFECTIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE OF THE DOLLAR BETWEEN 
FEBRUARY 2002 AND APRIL 2005
  (Contributions made by the currencies of the main trading 
partners in percentage points)
Source : Federal Reserve.
(1) Argentina, Australia, Chili, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, the Philippines, 













































































































THE US CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT : HOW DID IT COME ABOUT AND 
WHAT ARE THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As mentioned before, a current account deﬁ  cit  in 
the balance of payments reﬂ   ects a domestic savings 
shortfall in the economy concerned. It is therefore not 
surprising that the solution to the problem of the US 
current account deﬁ  cit is often sought by considering 
the restoration of the equilibrium between savings and 
investments in that country, and, in view of the substan-
tial government deﬁ  cit, the ﬁ  rst measure that comes to 
mind is ﬁ  scal consolidation. In that context, the simula-
tion results based on the economic models suggest that 
the US budget deﬁ  cit will need to be drastically reduced 
before it can have a marked effect on the US current 
account. The eventual macroeconomic impact of the 
consolidation also depends on the reaction of private 
savers, since a reduction in the deﬁ  cit in public savings 
may lower private savings even further, for example as 
a result of a more ﬂ   exible monetary policy or due to 
the prospect of lower taxes. According to NiGEM, nar-
rowing the US budget deﬁ  cit by 6 p.c. of GDP over six 
years would reduce real net imports into the country by 
1.2 p.c. of GDP by the end of this period. These results 
broadly match those obtained by the OECD based on the 
Interlink model, according to which a gradual shrinking 
of the US budget deﬁ  cit by 6 p.c. of GDP, also spread 
over six years, would lead to a 2.6 p.c. of GDP narrowing 
of the current account deﬁ  cit by the end of the period.
Since a depreciation of the dollar and US ﬁ  scal consolida-
tion would each, as an isolated measure, involve a con-
siderable adjustment in order to rebalance the US current 
account, the case is often made in favour of combining 
the two adjustment mechanisms. According to OECD 
calculations, a scenario combining a depreciation of the 
dollar by 15 p.c. and a reduction in the US budget deﬁ  cit 
by 4 p.c. of GDP would reduce the US current account 
deﬁ   cit by 2.5  p.c. of GDP after a period of six years. 
Based on the NiGEM model, a comparable improvement 
in real net exports would be achieved by shrinking the US 
budget deﬁ  cit by 6 p.c. of GDP and an additional currency 
adjustment of 25 p.c.
Finally, in part two, the strong US economic growth, 
which was signiﬁ  cantly higher than in Europe and Japan, 
particularly in the second half of the nineties, has been 
highlighted as a possible cause for the deterioration in 
the US trade balance. A ﬁ  nal option could be to bring 
about faster potential growth in the economies of 
these traditional trade partners of the United States. An 
important role therefore seems to be reserved for struc-
tural policies in those countries to increase productivity 
and employment. According to a number of research 
  ﬁ  ndings  (1), more vigorous growth outside the United 
States would however contribute only to a limited extent 
to a reduction of the US current account deﬁ  cit in the 
short or medium term. According to those calculations, 
a permanent increase in GDP growth of 0.5 percentage 
point in the euro area and Japan would reduce the US 
current account deﬁ  cit by just 0.2 p.c. of GDP after a 
TABLE 1 EFFECT ON THE US CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
Sources: Brook, Sédillot and Ollivaud (2004), OECD, NBB.
(1) Real net exports for the simulations based on the NiGEM-model.
Shock Effect on the US current account (1) after six years
Depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate of the dollar
OECD (Interlink)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.5 p.c. +1.3 p.c. of GDP
NBB (NiGEM)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 p.c. +1.0 p.c. of GDP
Fiscal consolidation in the US
OECD (Interlink)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +6 p.c. of GDP +2.6 p.c. of GDP
NBB (NiGEM)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +6 p.c. of GDP +1.2 p.c. of GDP
Combination of an exchange rate shock and fiscal consolidation
OECD (Interlink)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nominal effective USD : –15 p.c. and 
fiscal consolidation of 4 p.c. of GDP
+2.5 p.c. of GDP
NBB (NiGEM)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nominal effective USD : –25 p.c. and 
fiscal consolidation of 6 p.c. of GDP
+2.2 p.c. of GDP
More rapid growth achieved by the trading partners
Brook, Sédillot and Ollivaud (2004)  . . . . . GDP euro area and Japan +0.5 p.c. +0.2 p.c. of GDP
(1)  Brook, Sédillot and Ollivaud (2004)60
However, these common viewpoints tend, at times, to 
disguise diverging opinions on more speciﬁ  c solutions for 
tackling the global imbalances. The United States gener-
ally prefers to see market mechanisms play a greater 
role and therefore urges its Asian partners to make their 
exchange rates more ﬂ   exible. Furthermore, the trading 
partners of the United States should make every effort to 
boost their economic growth. The US authorities are nev-
ertheless committed to continue along the path of ﬁ  scal 
consolidation, and proceeded, in early 2005, to produce a 
draft budget for the ﬁ  scal year 2006 in which their inten-
tion was made more speciﬁ  c  : expressed as a percentage 
of GDP, the budget deﬁ  cit would have to be more than 
halved between 2005 and 2009.
As far as Europe is concerned, the ECB stressed that the 
rapid appreciation of the euro against the dollar, at the 
end of 2004, had not been welcome and that the US 
could make a signiﬁ  cant contribution to a narrowing of 
its current account deﬁ  cit if it adjusted its budget and 
increased national savings  (1).
Japan shares the concern of the Eurosystem regarding the 
risks of a sharp drop in the dollar, since the recovery of 
the Japanese economy is still very fragile. Indeed, such a 
drop in the dollar exchange rate would lead to a tighten-
ing of monetary conditions in Japan and therefore be at 
odds with the highly accommodative policy pursued by 
the Bank of Japan.
As for the Chinese authorities, they highlight the condi-
tions required before steps can be taken towards a more 
ﬂ   exible exchange rate system, i.e. a stable economic 
environment and a sound ﬁ  nancial  system.  Measures 
have already been taken in that respect. For example, 
the process of banking sector reforms received a boost 
from 2003 onwards with capital injections for two of 
the four public commercial banks which dominate the 
banking sector and that had a poor ﬁ  nancial  struc-
ture, due to the sheer volume of bad loans. Fearing an 
increase in these loans, the Chinese authorities adopted 
a series of measures in 2004 to curb excessive lending. 
Furthermore, a number of measures have recently been 
taken with a view to bringing about greater liberalisa-
tion of capital movements. Yet, China does not seem to 
be prepared, in the short term, to adjust its exchange 
rate policy, arguing that the frequently made claims that 
the renminbi is undervalued, are debatable. Although 
some factors seem to indicate that the Chinese currency 
is undervalued to some extent, such as the size of the 
Chinese trade surplus with the United States and the 
period of six years. Before dismissing the scenario as 
ineffectual, however, conﬁ   rmation of these ﬁ  ndings 
must be obtained from other studies.
The huge effort required to signiﬁ  cantly reduce the US 
current account deﬁ  cit again highlights the seriousness 
of the problem and underlines the need for simultaneous 
economic policy measures in the respective economies.
4.3   Viewpoints and measures of the economies 
concerned
Not only are the concerns regarding the US current 
account deﬁ   cit and the exchange rate movements the 
subject of economic scientiﬁ   c research, but they also 
appear at the top of the agenda of international forums, 
such as the G7 or G20 meetings.
For example, at the Dubai meeting in September 2003, the 
G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors already 
included the principle of exchange rate ﬂ  exibility in their 
statement. In addition, they underlined the importance of 
productivity growth and employment in the G7, although 
without examining the responsibility of each individual 
economy. The sudden drop in the value of the dollar at the 
end of 2003 and in early 2004, mainly against the euro, was 
an indication that the actual intentions of the Dubai state-
ment, namely greater exchange rate ﬂ  exibility in Asia, were 
not perceived as such by the markets. In the statements 
issued at the G7 meetings in February and April 2004, it 
was therefore highlighted that excessive volatility on the 
currency markets and disorderly currency ﬂ  uctuations were 
not desirable, whereas the desirability of greater exchange 
rate ﬂ  exibility was more geared towards countries with a 
policy of ﬁ  xed exchange rates, such as the Asian countries : 
“we emphasize that more ﬂ   exibility in exchange rates 
is desirable for major countries or economic areas that 
lack such ﬂ   exibility to promote smooth and widespread 
adjustments in the international ﬁ  nancial system, based on 
market mechanisms”. Moreover, on this occasion, the role 
of economic policy – particularly with regard to US budg-
etary policy and structural measures to stimulate growth 
in Europe and Japan –, in tackling global current account 
imbalances, was underlined. In subsequent statements, i.e. 
those issued at the G20 meeting in November 2004 and 
the G7 meeting in February and April 2005, the importance 
of macroeconomic and structural policy in the rebalancing 
of global imbalances was given more emphasis and the 
message was reiterated that excessive currency volatility 
was not desirable but exchange rate ﬂ  exibility was.
(1)  Trichet (2004), Issing (2003).61
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massive increase in its currency reserves, this conclusion 
is not backed up by other facts. For example, China has 
a trade deﬁ  cit with other emerging Asian economies, as 
a result of its “assembly” role in the regional production 
chain.
As mentioned before, most Asian economies, except 
Japan, pursue, like China, a strategy of (quasi-)ﬁ  xed 
exchange rates, for fear of losing their competitiveness, 
above all within the region. A “ﬁ   rst mover” problem 
therefore arises, which may delay the transition to more 
ﬂ  exible exchange rates in Asia. Nevertheless, South Korea 
has recently allowed its currency to rise in value against the 
dollar ; thus from January 2004 to April 2005, it was up by 
nearly 17 p.c., the sharpest increase among the United 
States’ main trading partners. Over the same period, the 
Taiwan dollar rose by 7 p.c. From October 2004, the Thai 
baht also appreciated and, at the end of 2004, the yen’s 
rise accelerated. Although these movements seem to 
suggest that these countries are starting to adjust their 
strategy  (1), it is too early to conclude that they have ﬁ  nally 
decided on a fundamental change of policy away from 
accumulating currency reserves and in favour of greater 
exchange rate ﬂ  exibility.
Conclusion
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the global 
economy today is the enormous US current account 
deﬁ  cit. Its sheer size is unprecedented, not only in the 
United States’ own post-war history, but it is also quite 
exceptional from an international perspective. The current 
situation is also unusual because the US deﬁ  cit contrasts 
sharply with the surpluses generated in nearly every other 
region, which has made this into a global problem.
The widening current account deﬁ  cit in the US balance of 
payments throughout the nineties can be almost entirely 
attributed to the deterioration in the balance of trade 
in goods. This was partly due to the US economy grow-
ing faster than the economies of its traditional trading 
partners, Americans displaying a degree of preference 
for foreign goods, the integration of China in the world 
economy and presumably also the lagged effect of the 
sharp appreciation of the dollar between mid-1995 and 
the end of 2001. The US current account deﬁ  cit  also 
reﬂ  ects a domestic shortfall in savings, which was initially 
due to a surge in investments against a background of 
sustained strong productivity growth and lower private 
savings. In 2002 and 2003, the sharp drop in investments 
brought about a rebalancing of the private saving-invest-
ment balances, but in the same period, the surplus in 
the public ﬁ   nances turned into a substantial deﬁ  cit.  It 
led to the re-emergence of the so-called “twin deﬁ  cit”, 
in addition to which the private saving-investment bal-
ance turned negative again in 2004. The start of the new 
millennium also brought marked changes to the way 
the US current account deﬁ  cit is ﬁ  nanced. For example, 
investments by Asian public authorities in US government 
bonds largely took over the position previously occupied 
by European private foreign direct investments and invest-
ments in equities.
Given the present size of the US current account deﬁ  cit, it 
is not surprising that concern over the sustainability of the 
imbalance has grown considerably in recent years. It has 
been claimed that the US, unlike other countries facing 
similar circumstances, is safeguarded from an attack on 
its currency because of its prominent role in the interna-
tional ﬁ  nancial system. According to an inﬂ  uential school 
of thought in economic literature, the current interna-
tional system can even be seen as a “revived” Bretton 
Woods system. Indeed, a number of East-Asian countries, 














CHART 10  EXCHANGE RATE OF THE EURO AND THE MAIN 
ASIAN CURRENCIES AGAINST THE DOLLAR
  (Indices September 2003 = 100)
Source : Federal Reserve.







p.m. Nominal effective exchange rate of 
the dollar (1)
(1)  Outside Asia, Russia has recently announced that it wants to abandon the dollar 
peg in order to bring its currency more into line with the euro.62
against the dollar, which brings to mind an informal dollar 
standard. Furthermore, just like in the original Bretton 
Woods system, the United States can still be considered 
as the “core nation” enjoying the privilege of issuing the 
main international reserve currency, and the countries in 
the “periphery” are prepared to buy dollars in order to 
achieve catch-up growth.
These exchange rate relations may nevertheless have led 
to distortions in US spending, while the Asian countries 
have to deal with a growing exchange rate risk in terms of 
their ofﬁ  cial reserves and a high opportunity cost of their 
interventions, as well as increasing difﬁ  culties in neutralis-
ing the liquidity created as a result of their interventions. 
Moreover, there is no institutional arrangement in place 
that would provide lasting support for the existing situa-
tion, unlike the original Bretton Woods system.
Different scenarios are conceivable to deal with the global 
imbalances. One option is to achieve this as far as pos-
sible via an exchange rate adjustment. In such a scenario, 
however, the risk of disorderly currency and interest rate 
ﬂ  uctuations cannot be excluded ; furthermore, the results 
of model simulations indicate that a huge depreciation of 
the dollar would be required to achieve a signiﬁ  cant nar-
rowing of the US current account deﬁ  cit. A mere adjust-
ment of exchange rates therefore does not look particu-
larly effective. Nor would isolated policy measures, such 
as ﬁ  scal consolidation in the US or the   implementation of 
structural reforms in the euro area and Japan to boost the 
growth potential of those economies, appear to offer an 
effective solution. If a gradual and orderly adjustment is 
to be achieved, these ﬁ  ndings in fact seem to imply that 
the economies involved should simultaneously implement 
measures in different policy areas, including the aim of 
gradually introducing greater exchange rate ﬂ  exibility in 
Asia.
The concern over global imbalances and the development 
of exchange rates, as well as the search for solutions, fea-
ture prominently on the agenda of international forums 
such as the G7 or G20 meetings. In the statements issued 
at those meetings, the need for a common approach to 
tackle the global imbalances is given priority and the belief 
that excessive exchange rate volatility is not desirable is 
underlined. Although the United States generally prefers to 
allow market mechanisms to play an important role, it did 
propose a budget in early 2005 with the aim of halving the 
budget deﬁ  cit by 2009. China, for its part, made it known 
that a number of conditions needed to be met, namely a 
stable economic environment and a sound ﬁ  nancial system, 
before steps could be taken, in the medium term, with a 
view to introducing a more ﬂ  exible exchange rate mecha-
nism. Finally, Europe and Japan committed themselves to 
the continued implementation of structural measures to 
boost the growth potential of their economies.63
THE US CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT : HOW DID IT COME ABOUT AND 
WHAT ARE THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Bibliography
BIS (2003), “China’s capital account liberalisation : international perspectives”, BIS Papers, 15.
BIS (2004), 74th Annual Report.
Blanchard O., F. Giavazzi and F. Sa (2005), “The US Current Account and the Dollar”, MIT Department of Economics 
Working Paper Series, 05-02.
Brook A.-M., Sédillot F. and Ollivaud P. (2004), “Channels for narrowing the US current account deﬁ  cit and implications 
for other economies”, OECD, Economics Department Working Papers, no. 390.
Dooley M.P., D. Folkerts-Landau and P. Garber (2003), “An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System”, NBER Working 
Paper Series, 9971.
Dooley M.P., D. Folkerts-Landau and P. Garber (2004), “Direct Investment, Rising Real Wages and the Absorption of 
Excess Labor in the Periphery”, NBER Working Paper Series, 10626.
Dooley M.P., D. Folkerts-Landau and P. Garber (2004), “The Revived Bretton Woods System  : the Effects of Periphery 
Intervention and Reserve Management on Interest Rates and Exchange Rates in Center Countries”, NBER Working Paper 
Series, 10332.
Eichengreen B. (2004), “Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods”, NBER Working Paper Series, 10497.
IMF (2002), World Economic Outlook, September.
IMF (2003), World Economic Outlook, September.
Issing O. (2003), 8th Annual Conference Europe and the US  : Partners and Competitors – New paths for the future, 
Speech, London, 28 October.
McCauley R.N. (2003), “Capital ﬂ  ows in East Asia since the 1997 crisis”, BIS Quarterly Review, June.
OECD (2004), “Chapter V : the Challenges of Narrowing the US Current Account Deﬁ  cit”, the OECD Economic Outlook, 
75, June.
Roubini N. and B. Setser, (2005), Will the Bretton Woods 2 Regime Unravel Soon? The Risk of a Hard Landing in 2005-
2006, mimeo.
Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2003), Dubai, September.
Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2004), Boca Raton, Florida, February.
Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2004), Washington DC, April.
Statement of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2004), Berlin, November.
Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2005), London, February.
Summers L.H. (2004), “The US Current Account Deﬁ  cit and the Global Economy”, The Per Jacobson Lecture.
Trichet J.C. (2004), Introductory statement to the press conference. Questions and answers. December